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ABSTRACT This article presents Weinberger’s normative institutionalism and action 
theory as a basis for solution of selected questions connected with character of relation 
of institutionalized behaviour and formal organizations. It points out at possibilities of 
collaborative mechanisms vitalising in social systems and submits different statements 
or doubts concerning the substance of rational models of formal organizations and 
methodological individualism.
Key words: institution, institutionalization, organization, action theory, information.
Introduction
A social behaviour, which shows certain manifestations of regularity, repeatability or 
stereotyping of operations and actions, is directed towards creation of such behav-
ioural models which in widely understood context gains institution character. Any 
form of organizing is not possible without existence of stable, for most of participat-
ing processors comprehensible and acceptable “manuals” for satisfaction of various 
needs and reaching of established goals. It is basis for creation of communication 
mechanisms at mutual exchange of information in processes of continual produc-
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exists which gives to these links and relations sense and purpose. In other words to 
enable organizing it is necessary that basic supporting mechanisms are developed 
in relevant social environment that has its substance in institutionalized behaviour. 
Such behaviour is based on existence of functional codes which contain specific, for 
most of members comprehensible, meanings. Knowledge of these codes and ability 
to understand their meanings is inevitable presumption for creation of organisation 
processes in environment where certain basic rules (standards) are applicable.
According to this, the social institutions area and their substance is key the essence 
of understanding and study of social organizing. Its connection to norms scope and 
substance of social existence normative background in all its manifestations help to 
orientate in searching for solutions for studying of social life organizational base. 
This approach represents “normative and regulative perspectives operating through 
the enforcement of rules and norms“ (Baptista, 2009) and contrasts the cognitive-
cultural pillar of Scot’s (2001) framework, that is corresponding with Institution-
al-Based Trust Theory (Zucker, 1986). According to Zucker, “institutions emerge 
through culture and shared value system, because these system „preserve dominant 
reward and sanction schemas“ (Baptista, 2009:403). According to the cognitive-cul-
tural perspective, institutionalized behaviour is determined by the relative stability, 
legitimacy and power of “common understanding that are seldom explicitly articu-
lated“ (Zucker, 1983).
Coleman (1991:704) on question about substance of social rules introduces the an-
swer: „Social rules have two dimensions. In one respect, they are descriptions and 
characterizations of what people do as a rule. As such, they correspond closely to 
Austin’s „habits of obedience“ (1954). Habits of obedience, however, lack a norma-
tive dimension. By conceiving of these habits as motivated by the credible threats of 
the sovereign, Austin fails to address this second, normative dimension.” Social rules 
can have normative force in that they have a prescriptive or reason-giving dimen-
sion. Whether they provide reasons for action depends on citizens accepting them 
from an internal point of view.
1. Normative institutionalism by Weinberger
The classical means of normative institutionalism (March and Olson, 1984) offer 
one of the possible framework for the institutional basis of organizational analysis. 
Especially because of: 1. they emphasize the relevance of norms, and 2. they view 
the institutions as a tools, that form the basic framework for individual action in the 
social processes.
Based on O. Weinberger (1995) and his understanding of substance of normative 
institutionalism it can be distinguished between investigation of standard as: a) 
thought entity – in sphere of normative ideal essences (as thought, idea, abstraction 
which “is here even when it’s not performed”), b) social reality – social existence 
of standards as sociological reality which is possible to establish only empirically on 
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for realization of idea realization). Problem of social standard existence as social fact 
meets with attitudes of positivistic conceptions - Schauer’s presumptive positivism 
(1991), Raz (1984) but also law’s sociology.
Normative institutionalism tries to answer the question ”in which lies social existence 
of norms (to whom they are addressed, in what environment, what is their form) 
and what functions have norms in social reality” (Weinberger, 1995:15).
Concerning organizing it is necessary to solve continually the problem of goal reach-
ing through processes of organizing, coordination and cooperation. Basis of these 
processes is existence of more or less functional rules which respecting is a pre-
sumption of effective behaviour in relation to reaching the established goals formu-
lated on basis of common interest. Rules or norms and institutions are related to 
each other very closely when continuous consideration aims towards understanding 
of rule existence as basis for creation of models and behaviour patterns defined as 
social institutions. It is possible than to talk about normative determination of social 
institutions which contains: 1. necessity of rules as behaviour regulators which are 
understood by social environment – as presumption of establishing and function 
of institutions, but at the same time 2. immanently (in its substance) in institutions, 
where is contained character of regulator as pattern or behaviour model which ena-
bles to answer question “how?” (to satisfy needs and reach goals).
Tuomela (1995:138, see also Tuomela and Balzer, 1999) has elsewhere briefly 
sketched an account of social institutions that emphasizes the normative character 
of social institutions. “This account relies on two kinds of collectivity “made” and 
accepted social norms: 1. formal or informal rule-norms („r-norms“ – r-institutions), 
which are based, directly or indirectly, on group-authorized agreement-making and 
2. proper social norms („s-norms“ – s-institutions), which are eigher society-wide or 
group-specific norms based on normative collective expectations and require action 
in response to them” (1995:139). Tuomela solves also problem of social institution 
genesis in context of collective activity meaning.
Weinberger investigates which relations exist between norms and institutions on 
basis of reasoning about action theory.
In most general meaning an action can be described as that part of human behav-
iour which is purpose-oriented, i.e. focused on reaching of more or less specific 
goals with using of available resources. Action is than basis, presumption and part 
of decision-making processes which in organizational environment gains specific 
character and forms. Inevitable presumption of any decision-making is availability of 
information therefore Weinberger approach and his action theory is very productive 
material for study of institutional background of formal organizations.
As part of each decision-making is information processing, it is acceptable that 
Weinberger understands acting as behaviour determined by information i.e. sub-
stance of action is explained by structure of information processing processes which 






















Sociologija i prostor, 50 (2012) 192 (1): 89-108
is determined mainly by goal and purpose determination, intentional behaviour. 
Among information processing processes which determine action belong necessarily 
processing of practical as well as descriptive information.
1. 1. Two types of information – descriptive and practical
Information processing processes or information processing procedures work in 
relation to two types of information. These enable basic orientation in decision-
making area and enable to proceed towards reaching of goals for sake of purposes 
which characterize meaning of all current operations. Character of this information 
follows stabilizing and dynamizing elements of decision-making and also indicate 
manner in which information can be processed and their purpose. Action is actually 
possible only if subject of action has available relevant information.
We distinguish two types of information: 1. about the state of matters, i.e. theoreti-
cal, descriptive information, 2. about how is possible to solve certain technical tasks 
(programs, projects, know-how, solution guidelines including interpretations of de-
scriptive information and finding their contexts) – practical information.
Specific meaning in decision-making process or in process of information process-
ing have except these two types of information, information which provide knowl-
edge about progressing state in action process – feedback information. Practical 
information are opposite to theoretical, descriptive sentences:
1. Main meaning difference lies in fundamentally different pragmatic functions. 
Theoretical sentences are those which describe, while our effort is to reach ad-
equate correspondence of descriptive sentences – or its content – with real state 
of matters in the world. 
Practical sentences have pragmatic function to determine directly or indirectly 
how should the world be and how it is possible to create or change it through 
action.
2. Practical sentences are principally system-relative which enables that these sen-
tences are valid in one system while they are not valid in other system. 
3. Practical sentences are not true in same sense as theoretical sentences. They 
can’t be explained by experiment and observation; they can’t be tested by real-
ity of the world. Their reasoning depends on other assumed (accepted) practi-
cal sentences. Also experience, specifically assessment experience can be inte-
grated into practical reasoning. For example it is possible hypothetically in mind 
to prefer subject A over subject B – marriage over friendship – and to test this 
relative assessment (length of duration, value structures ...). Practical sentences 
can be tested only through other (mediatory) “sentences”, not directly (through 
indicators, through testimonies of people (respondents) about phenomenon.
While descriptive sentences can be marked as true or untrue, practical information 
misses the truth value, they can be more valid and void. For example normative 
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1.2. Normative sentences
Action process is always performed in environment where activity of participants are 
concerning common interest’s solution and reaching the common important goals 
regulated by functional normative system. For social action are as standard-making 
important two types of normative sentences as basement for creation of norms 1. 
elementary normative sentences and 2. combined normative sentences.
Elementary normative sentences are created by normative operator and issue of fact 
description as its argument. It is useful to come from two basic normative opera-
tors: 1. operator “shall be” and 2. operator “may be” (to the philosophical question 
“shall be” and “may be” see more Geffert, 2008:52). As exclusively regulative func-
tion have only sentences “shall be” (because sentences “may be” don’t exclude any 
alternative), these shall be substance of normative system (each system of norms). 
“May be” sentences have only secondary function: they express limitation or deletion 
of what “shall be”. They indicate possibility to create variations, alternatives, modi-
fications, reconstructions by which they contribute to support, maintenance and 
enlargement of action freedom space.
It is necessary to distinguish between open and closed system of norms, only in 
closed ones is applicable “What is not forbidden is permitted”. Further it is neces-
sary to distinguish strong and weak permissibility: 1. P is strongly permitted if it is 
explicitly permitted or even ordered, 2. P is weakly permitted if there doesn’t exist any 
forbiddance of P within the system. 
Based on Veblen understanding regarding understanding of character of construct-
ing of current society, dominancy of operator “shall be” can be assigned to systems 
which he calls manipulative, while dominancy of “may be” operator is typical for so 
called cooperative systems (Harvey and Katovich, 1992).
Combined normative sentences – they are created using standard-making functors 
(they are not truth functors). They are defined using characteristic rules of resulting 
consequences. This way can be used also in definition of conditioning functor of 
norms. They are created as combination of elementary sentences (e.g. if “A” must 
be than “B” must be, if A must be, than B may be, if the condition “A” is met than 
must (may, mustn’t´) be “B”, if “A” must be and “B” may be than “C” mustn’t be etc.).
1.3. Action theory
Weinberger´s theory of action, in version in which is submitted, based on Searl´s 
conception of human action (1995) as being responsive to “external reasons” - in 
strong contribution of information and communication theory, institution theory and 
theory of norms – is very efficient tool for solution of formal organization institu-
tional background problems. Despite doubts of some authors about Searl´s theory of 
social reality (Viskovatoff, 2003), it is possible to consider as suitable starting point 
and basis for further analyses of social action and for study of social institutions, 
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Weinberger’s understanding of action theory is formal-finalistic in double relation: 
1. characterizes action as process of information processing which can be ad-
dressed to each subject (unit, group, community, society) – not only to psycho-
physical persons or individuals – as it is submitted by M. Weber in his substance 
of understanding approach to social phenomenon study. „The new institutional-
ism in organization theory and sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor 
models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cogni-
tive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of supraindividual 
units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences 
of individuals’ attributes or motives“ (DiMaggio and Powel, 1991:8). „No social 
process can be understood save as it is located in the behaviour of individu-
als...“ (Selznick, 1957:4).
2. it is based on finality theory as it is based on the term of causal relation given 
in advance (it means that phenomenon are perceived as deterministic as it is 
applicable that relation between cause and consequence is determined, that we 
know what is the cause and we know what we observe as a consequence – 
causality direction is stated).
Concept of action can be relate not only to psycho-physical action actors. Human 
and human society is constituted so, that there exists also other – institutional action 
actors. There exists collective action, action of organizations which perform their 
authorities, etc.
Most simple way how to characterize formal-finalistic theory of action is to compare 
it at least in several points with other action concepts: 1. What distinguish action 
from other forms of behaviour?, 2. Is action related to term freedom of action and 
how is it possible to explain freedom of action or its determinisms?, 3. How is it pos-
sible to explain content of individual’s action? How is explained action motivation 
and performance of decision-making, 4. How is explained influence of individual 
– society relation on action?
Ad 1. Action differs significantly from other kinds of behaviour or other systems. 
For defining of the term action is crucial that action is determined and managed by 
information process using descriptive information, it is not instinctive behaviour or 
spontaneous (unintended), it aims towards decision-making (making of decisions). 
Consciousness is secondary not primary constitutive sign of action (conscious is un-
derstood as rational and logic) as some information are processed “intuitively”, “with 
feeling”. Consciousness is so possible but not inevitable for processing of informa-
tion – and decision-making.
Ad 2. Action is understood as behaviour determined by special information process. 
This information process has to be expressed in scope of action alternatives. Action 
can exists only there are spaces for action i.e. where subject has possibility of choice 
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In accordance with bifurcation of behaviour trajectory to alternatives, variants be-
tween which is decided on basis of information process freedom is conceptual pre-
sumption of action. It is very important attribute of action, without freedom it is not 
possible to adequately consider the action.
M. Weber proceed conversely and he preferred intensive regulation, control, mecha-
nisms of strong centralism, so to the space without freedom. Weber’s action is relat-
ed to individual in usually not free space, strongly regulated and limited concerning 
possibilities of solutions development as products of choice and decision-making. It 
means that space of freedom is strongly limited or not possible at all in rational sys-
tems (bureaucracy) where emphasize put on predictability and controllability leads 
to narrowing of possible decision-making to usually in advance stated procedures 
or behavioural patterns. This space is limited also by strong orientation on only one 
possible result – effective maximization of subject benefit (in individual person’s 
action). 
Ad 3. Presumption for action is always active approach of system (subject) to which 
is the action attributed. Each living being has included (immanently) certain kind 
of activity and this is applicable analogically also in social systems. This activity is 
manifested in habitualized behavioural patterns (i.e. those which are result of learn-
ing of habits, customs, norms, institutions, patterns in specific social conditions). 
Information process, information processing related to decision-making, influences 
content of action.
Content of action can be identified on basis of motives which are presumption and 
part of purpose and goal development formulated as expression of common interest 
and creation of direction. When we talk about motives, we think on what determines 
action or explain way (content) of subject action. A reason for action is internal if it 
is part of the agent’s “subjective motivational set” (Williams, 1981:102). Searl in his 
construct of normativity emphasizes also the external reasons, by that agents can be 
influenced.
Motive – reason, explanation, of action, final reason of action. Final motives repre-
sent core of motivation. The game enters also other determinants, mainly autono-
mous or heteronomous fixed norms. 
Explanation of action is possible using motive interpretation, i.e. reconstruction of 
information process determining action. Motives are than basically interpreted pur-
poses. Usually plays this role not only one but more purposes.
Ad 4. Human acting depends on relation between individual and societies and also 
social institutions.
Habitualized behavioural patterns and purposes which the individual follows are 
signated not only with his internal, biologic needs but considerably also by following 
other people behavioural patterns. “Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility 






















Sociologija i prostor, 50 (2012) 192 (1): 89-108
recurrence of specific acts” (Dewey, 1930 In: Jensen, 1987:1044).
Action is often interaction between more subjects or collective acting, activities of 
individual are often composed into behavioural norms and they are determined by 
expectations in relation to action of “other people or societies” (Dobiaš, 2009:30).
1.4. Institutionalization and institutions 
Defining or limitation of institutions is a task which put high demands on explana-
tion of at least few problems. These are related mainly to area of norms but also 
social reality, social roles, social relations, ways of creation stereotypes and regulari-
ties in social behaviour of individual and group etc.
Regarding this Weinberger emphasizes: 1. absence of clear definition of the term 
“institution”, 2. need to limit the institution sphere, 3. necessity to submit compre-
hensive classification or typology of institutions.
Weinberger works with Searl´s theory of institutions which ask questions regarding 
“institutional facts” (Searle, 1995:2) and their origin in social reality. Searle argues, 
that “all of institutional reality can be explained” by means of three notions that he 
develops – collective intentionality, the assignment of function, and constitutive 
rules (Searle, 1998:124).
Social institutions are taken to be norm-governed social practices introducing a new 
social and conceptual status on the practices or some elements involved in those 
practices (Tuomela, 2003:123). Such formulated definition has its starting point in 
collective acceptance. Author presumes it with knowledge that the word “institu-
tion” is often used rather vaguely.
Weinberger tries to state relevant signs of the term, what shall serve as explanation 
why he uses the term “institution” as basic term of social-science and legal-science 
research.
An institution concept shall surround sphere of our study so the human action could 
be understood and explained as summary of wanting, action and connection of 
individuals with social factors and also framework culture conditions. For investiga-
tion of such understood institution is necessary existence of coordination between 
individual and society (social agreement – as basic norm).
Phenomenon of institutionalization exists in each community. What behaves as pat-
tern or model of behaviour, as way of acting or as interaction system has, in certain 
circumstances, tendency to institutionalize – to stabilize in its form and gain the 
character of social reality with relatively independent, own life, it becomes model 
which co-create form of life.
In the literature can be observed a wide range of temporal dynamics associated 
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diffuse, and become legitimated over time and at varying rates“ (Lawrence, Winn 
and Jennings, 2001:8). Several typologies of institutional mechanisms have been 
proposed (e.g., DiMaggio and Powel, 1983, Powell, 1991; Scott, 1991, 1995).
Lawrence, Winn and Jennings (2001) argue, that the traditional model of institution-
alization as typified by the S-shaped diffusion curve (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; 
Rogers, 1995; Strang and Tuma, 1993) masks a variety of temporal patterns in institu-
tionalization. They propose an alternative set of institutionalization curves based on 
the type of institutional mechanisms agents use to support the process, more exactly 
the heterogeneous set of „processes“ (Clarc, 1985) (dynamic aspects of institutionali-
zation). The pace of institutionalization is defined by Lawrence, Winn and Jennings 
(2001) as the length of time taken for an innovation to become diffused throughout 
an organizational (or societal) field. 
Institutionalization as process exceeds innovation aspect and includes production 
and development of behavioural models as well as its transformation and modifica-
tion tendencies in its current environment. Despite it mechanisms which support 
institutionalization process can be accepted in Lawrence, Winn and Jennings (2001) 
conception.
According to Selznick the institutionalization is a neutral idea, which can be defined 
as „the emergency of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, 
loosely organized, or narrowly technical activities“ (Broom and Selznick, 1955:238). 
„Institutionalization constrains conduct in two main ways: by bringing it within 
a normative order, and by making it hostage to its own history“ (Selznick, 1992:232).
DiMagio and Powell (1983) explained three mechanisms for institucionalization: 1. 
coercive, 2. normative and 3. mimetic pressures. Coercive pressure is often associ-
ated with the state and refers to the threat or actual use of force by a powerful actor 
in order to gain compliance. Normative pressure stems from cultural expectations 
that actors feel compelled to honour. Mimetic pressure involves the perception of 
some value of mimicking behaviour from other referent actor (Lawrence, Winn and 
Jennings, 2001). 
Lawrence, Winn and Jennings (2001) suggest for defining of institutionalization 
mechanism combination of 1. influence and discipline, 2. force and domination 
with respect to the concept of power – episodic and systemic.
Definition of institution has to satisfy four requirements: 1. to connect on natural-
ized usage of language, sharpen and correct it, 2. to be usable creative mean for 
presented theory, 3. to be sufficiently universal (for usage in various areas of study 
and management and for various purposes), 4. it has to be accessible to specification 
considering specific conditions of application. 
Problem of limit sharpness of the institution term moves effort for its definition to 
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Institutions are systems of human behaviour. There is contained core of practical 
information. In this regard they are always complex phenomenon if they consist of 
arranged system of practical information which is related to effect of psychic and 
social facts and procedures (Weinberger, 1995).
Searle (1995) works with construct institutional facts in this view. He suggests the 
three basic ingredients in creation of institutional facts: „1. the imposition of a new 
function on an entity, 2. collective intentionality and 3. the distinction between con-
stitutive and regulative rules“ (1995:28).
Tuomela (2003:141) suggests following classification of increasingly stronger social 
institutions can now be usefully proposed in view of or discussion: 1. institution as 
norm-governed social practice, 2. institution confering a new conceptual and social 
status to some entity (e.g., person, object, or activity), 3. institution conferring a new 
deontic status and status functions to go with it to the members of the collective in 
question, 4. institution as an organization involving social positions and a task-right 
system.
Last definition position is for our access relevant at most, it presume identification 
of relation institution and organization in dynamic of normative systems, subject 
of organizing and position characteristics. Tuomela calls this position ”standard” 
cases of social institutions (Tuomela 2003:141), that don´t excludes the activation 
of another meaning in the framework of the classification. It also argues, that „all 
institutions are normative in some sense allthough not always in one and the same 
sense“ (2003:147).
Perri (2003:395) defines the institution as a „formal or informal constraining social 
rule, convention or norm, in according with approach of North (1990:3), which 
structures interaction, which is recognized by those subject to it (by Knight, 1992:2), 
as creating an accountability or some duty to provide an account of performance 
and be subject to appraisal and either sanction or reward, however informal (by 
Douglas, 1980, 1986), and which leads to the forming of more or less stable social 
patterns (by Jepperson, 1991:145)“ (for a review of definitions, see Peters, 1999).
Term institution signs special type of generic term: always where we talk about insti-
tution it is something having analogical core. It means that each institution presents 
model of behaviour which has its substance (core), which provides preservation of 
its substance also in number of empiric variants (for example marriage as institution 
can have various form in historical development or regarding various cultures but 
core of this institution enables stability of its substance) – this are relation between 
individuals and societies, relation with certain tendency to durability, relative regu-
larity a normative regulation – individual institutions have however different nature 
so it is not possible to fix unique class of definition signs.
Important elements which lead to statement of the term institution (by Weinberger):
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individual subject (individuals, groups, organizations) and societies. Behaviour 
of individual depends on social relations: his individual action is signed with 
relations to surrounding, inherited abilities, internalized models, when important 
is also active creative influencing and modification of behavioural patterns from 
the individual’s side. Human behavior is also fundamentally determined by 
the axiological system of the individual but also by the systems of values of 
particular social groups (Geffert, 2010a:87).
2. Term institution is related to term institutionalization, process of development of 
institutions. Institutions always means some kind of stabilization, development 
of models, standards, and life forms which are characterized by certain relative 
stability, not constancy or changelessness. They are orientations, directions of 
action and also elements of social reality and basis of all kinds of social action. 
Institutions are sphere where these fixings are created in certain chaining of 
individual and social.
3. Institutions contains systems of practical information, approaches, guidelines, 
standardized procedures – how to act. Without institutions action would be 
impossible. For example action towards gaining of resources for cultural sights 
protection project in municipality would have available only descriptive in-
formation, we would know what is cultural sights protection but we wouldn’t 
know how to provide it, we would know what should contain the project (pro-
ject structure) but we wouldn’t know how to provide it. It is not easy to state re-
lations between institutions as observable social realities and applicable systems 
of norms and values. Effective action, learning and all forms of social action pre-
sume certain fixing of intentions (motives, intents, and purposes) and setting of 
norms of behaviour. All institutionalized contains core of normative regulation. 
Institutions are not only certain regularities of individuals and societies but they 
are connected also with “shall be” rules. Each man as individual has practical 
attitudes and each social situation brings into life practical attitudes and norms. 
For example institute of marriage contains “shall be” – two and more partners 
(not only one), formalization of cohabitation (not free) even way of formaliza-
tion can be different, accepted by social environment (including legal norms).
4. Emerging and social existence of institutions lies on human interaction, on 
constitution of tasks and connections of value beliefs of acting people. We talk 
about basic consensus about value standards. It is not right to assume that cor-
respondence of value attitudes of all participating people – basic consensus 
– is required to establish institution or even that institutions are established on 
grounds of this basic consensus. There is possibility that institution is possible 
only on basis of various attitudes. For example marriage as social fact has also its 
value dimension (extent) – in consensus as wide social approval created mean-
ing, purpose. So marriage is generally perceived as space which enters people 
who agree (really or outwards) with this aim, meaning and purpose. Than 
is “entering marriage” valuable in according with societal context. Variety of 
people´s attitudes to marriage is obvious and creates wide range of opinion and 
value orientation. Despite it most people in society close marriage or focus their 
activities towards this goal and value of marriage with larger or smaller changes 
remains. These values are created in processes of permanent interactions (it is 
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only for individual subject, it couldn’t arise and function as social institution). 
5. Institutions exist on form of socially institutionalized normative systems of rules 
(e.g. as institutions of law, ethics, culture or religion, for more see Geffert, 
2010b:204) and as real individual cases of relevant institution. Example can be 
marriage as legally stated institution and example of marriage with statement of 
persons (husband and wife) and objects (relations, property) what organization 
theory and social knowledge view as establishment of organization with exist-
ence of active subject (connection and continuity of individual and organiza-
tion).
6. Institution is only institutionalized as system of rules – and as such it is part of 
law or other normative order – or it is entity of social reality consisting of per-
sons in certain relations and objects which are in relation to the institution or its 
persons included in the institution. It means that institution exist as model which 
shows certain way of behaviour also in “latent” condition – even when nobody 
performs it – as set of rules and guidelines. Except this it can function as social 
reality – in the moment when specific subject decides to accept this behavioural 
model in specific situation. Then institution on idea level becomes institution on 
practical level when with entry of subject happen “materialising” of institution 
in the organization form (formal or informal). Here institution becomes entity 
of social reality, basis on which is developed organizational behaviour which 
includes specific subjects in specific situation, formulation of intents, purposes 
and goals and also tool basement of activities. 
7. Metaphorically it can be said that institutions live “their own life”. In this regard 
it is justified to see in them objective realities sui generis. It is present let’s say 
certain “moment of laziness” what means that institutionalized forms – e.g. legal 
institutions – stay preserved despite their meaning and purpose is over. It is 
problem of huge persistence of social institutions which is connected primarily:
a) with character of institution as behavioural model which is in its nature ab-
stract – function as idea (global idea) – idea can hardly (can’t ) be cancelled 
(as for example organisation),
b) with way of “statement” of institution as result of institutionalization process. 
It is usually long-term process which includes wide social acceptance (in-
stitution doesn’t arise on basis of agreement between two persons), then so 
widely socially approved model is hard to “cancel”,
c) institutions have ability of transformation, or tendency to certain develop-
ment (adaptation on current conditions) and so their operation can be often 
misleading. Institution of marriage exists for whole centuries – in various 
cultures but its character, function, meaning in social reality has changed. 
This doesn’t mean that its functionality in society automatically increases (as 
behavioural model).
8. Institutions get in tight connection with basic idea which the institution serves 
and by which is characterized its existence and its development. This global idea 
– central idea can explain basic characteristic of institution, but we shouldn’t 
presume that form this encapsulated characteristic can be stated development 
of institution. “Own life” of institution excludes fossilization of central idea. 
Global idea is for character of institution cardinal, determining. It has key func-
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introduce global idea “in life” – in social unit in materialized form of social unit.
9. Institution is despite high degree of universality in many cases very strongly 
connected with environment in which it has emerged and stabilized. “Transfer” 
in the other environment assume necessary range of institution modification 
with regard to character of new environment. According to this, it is applicable 
that institution (e.g. know how) which was in its original (“parental”) environ-
ment highly effective will be in new conditions little effective or fail or require 
such intensive interventions in its substance that it is more convenient to think 
of development of original models then using of “borrowed ones”.
All institutions have certain common signs; otherwise they can be of different type 
so the term institution creates more generic than individual term. Institutions have 
common relation to context of action, i.e. their function is determination of individ-
ual and social behaviour, they are connecting segment between action of individuals 
and societies in which individuals belong and they are connected to core of socially 
existing practical information, primarily normative regulators.
1.5. Purposes and goals
Purposes have to be understood, by Weinberger, as volitional actions of subjects – 
as expression of certain direction of activity (not spontaneous but intentional). Their 
use or function is not to label the object. They have certain situational content, de-
scribing state which shall be reached or express their relation to desired state (goal) 
or set measure of action. They are set of contents which with its meaning respect 
character of goals.
For example goal of non-profit organisation is to gain financial means for project for 
educational activities of unemployed. This is explicitly formulated goal which can be 
described in various ways when this description also contains (includes) determina-
tion of means for its reaching. Then purposes can be understood as set of contents 
and means, activated on the way to the goal (long-term, short-term).
Constitutive element of purpose is that certain content is determined as desired (in-
tended). What does it mean can be explained only by showing its pragmatic func-
tion of purposes i.e.: that they present decisive function for determining of action 
with regard to stated goal.
Purpose content can be reaching of certain state, final state that shall be reached. As 
purpose can act also orientation value which shall be kept (compare also the term 
homeostasis) or it is stated desired stable state (e.g. prosperity as purpose) or goal 
which fulfilment is time-consuming process (e.g. to learn English).
For purpose it is not deciding if its content expresses end, final point of action which 
is considered for stated purpose but the fact that certain content is presented as de-
sired, as through action satiable wanting. According to this term purpose and goal 
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Goal is with its character in position of “reached” state: one-off – to get investor, for 
development in IT sector of one organizational department of autonomous govern-
ment in specific region), or permanently – to provide effective services for citizens 
– clients.
Purpose is everything that can be included in the “content” of action and decision-
making, i.e. set of tools (ideas, strategies, character of resource distribution – human, 
information etc., way of coordination and management, way of communication…).
For activation and dynamizing of purposes and goals important role plays what 
Tuomela (2003) calls “collective acceptance”, that basically says the parts of the 
social world it applies to are collectively constructed and man-made“ (2003:157).
1.5.1. Relations between purposes and goals, dynamics of purposes and goals
Content of purpose determination can be specific in different measure. So can be-
tween purposes relations of superiority and subordination as well as purpose as-
signments arise. Relations between purposes and goals don’t exclude conflict between 
purposes and goals (e.g. if goal is reached with inadequate means or purpose system 
indicates direction of system to other than officially demonstrated goals; or possibili-
ties within area of resources indicates unreality of reaching stated goal etc.). 
System of purposes is system of real tendencies, not description of possible world; 
conflicts belong in certain sense to substance of these systems. These conflicts are 
not purpose system deficiencies which could make them unusable.
Purpose system has its dynamics (applicable also for goals). Already Wilhelm Wundt 
alerted on important psychological fact. His term purpose heterogony shows the fact 
that man at observing of so far accepted purposes and goals on basis of experi-
ence and probably also because of new life situations in world and on basis of new 
technical and social possibilities composes new purposes, enlarges and modifies his 
target statements.
There exists also change of purpose system assigned to certain person or other sub-
ject on grounds of individual’s or society’s development (or other societies). E.g. 
constellation of small business purposes will be significantly changed if it will ex-
pand to large business.
Usually at system analysing (e.g. institutions or organisation) we compose basic goals 
which are relatively stable and determine essential intentions. These goals how-
ever can be in various relations to other system goals – superior, inferior, assigned 
independent, dependent etc. This phenomenon is called optical relativity of goals 
because of all goals and their analyses or analyses of from them resulting facts or 
with them related facts are parts of sophisticated complex relations within system 
and between systems. For example goals of National employment bureau are clearly 
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are stated regardless on other circumstances. When composing these goals into 
goals of other structures, e.g. Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the 
Slovak republic or individual goals of the unemployed person, goals of National 
employment bureau gain more precise but above all differentiated contours.
2. From institution to formal organization
Social institutions same as “their” organizations are based on norms and they can’t 
be understood only as simple regularities of behaviour. But “institutions are to be 
distinguished from formal organizations and from social organization: an organiza-
tion is a set of empirical institutions bounded by membership, foundation and disso-
lution and with at least one explicitly prescribed purpose which is supposed ideally 
to govern the collective action of these members (Perri, 2003:397)”.
Normative systems (laws, moral...) determine behaviour which “shall be” or “may 
be” but this don’t use up their social function. In according with norms are divided 
competences, is constituted right to power, organizations which creates space for 
possible action and mainly where behaviour or action of individual is connected 
with institutional framework (I can get married only if legal institution of marriage 
exists).
Process of institution forming towards creation of organized environment is closely 
connected to system of purposes and goals. Line between institution and organiza-
tion is visible in moment of concretization of normative attributes (norms which 
determine character of institution differ from norms which provide operation of 
organization although their mutual connection is inevitable – therefore base for 
existence and function of institution and also base for existence and function of 
organizations is “normative system” – system of rules.
Institutionalization of societal life means permanent socialization of individual ac-
tivities, intents, and ways of acting. It means that institution is exclusively social 
phenomenon which assumes certain “audience” and range of its acceptance in rela-
tion to stated rules.
Institution is not exactly specified on level of action subject. Action subject can be 
any person or group (team). Subject specification stadium assume development of 
strictly limited unit which with regard to institutional purposes and goals directs its 
action. Only subject can set goal of its function (this goal “excuses” existence and 
function of organization) and to create purpose system as tools for its reaching 
(achieving).
In relation to institution we can’t talk about subject as its substance is connected 
with idea – “global idea” and its wide social approval (legitimization). It means that 
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Establishment and function of organization is not possible without existence of sub-
ject (which realizes it).
2.1. How to distinguish institution from organization
Institution as pattern and model of behaviour is characterized by certain universal-
ity. Universality is its basic characteristic in relation to intercultural specifics. That 
means that substance of institution is everywhere understood equally (if the institu-
tion already exists) but its content and normative limitation can show mutual dif-
ferences. For example in each culture which knows education system, that system 
means the same (education system, system of training and education, system educa-
tional-training, system of organizations which provide education, system eliminat-
ing illiteracy etc.)
Differences can occur already on level of normative regulators – somewhere is by 
law provided free access to education somewhere is considered self-financing also 
from school fees, somewhere it is obligatory, somewhere optional. Further there 
may exist differences within the institution (e.g. position of private schools in rela-
tion to state and religious schools).
Universality on level of organizations is controversial. It exists mainly on level of 
“global idea”. Each real organization is with its character of function significantly 
connected with conditions in which it follows its goals (economic, legislative, social, 
political, cultural etc.), it can’t be omitted that each organizational unit is necessary 
to understand as unique specific organizational area although through goal ideas 
of subject it is connected to “idea“ which functions universally – each school is 
significantly specific, unique organizational unit despite all schools realize idea of 
education and training in relatively equal (social) conditions.
Global idea is determined by purpose or set of purposes due to which institution 
has been established and exists. It provides continuity of model – institution and its 
organization.
Continuity means that establishment of institution (on basis of global idea) and 
institutionalization process (creation of normative limitation of institution and its 
integration in the social environment) is parallel with development of organization 
background of institution. E.g. global idea of education could arise but it was re-
alised only by establishment of the first school. So we can say that development of 
institution follows certain purpose (and prepares “ground” for system of purposes 
as tools – for reaching of goal determined by subject as reason for establishment of 
organization) and organization exists in view of certain goal (in this context is espe-
cially suitable to differ purposes and goals and don’t use them as synonyms. Could 
this happen also reversely? Was it necessary to set global idea of education to first 
school being established? Is establishment of one school sufficient for developing 
of school institution? – Definitely not because except its normative determinations, 
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It is hard to answer the question – what was first, institution or organization (al-
though global idea is connected primary with institution, in organizational condi-
tions finds its by goal limited possibilities for realization in praxis).
3. Conclusion
The Weinberger`s normative institutionalism can be very useful in reaching the 
appropriate approach to many organizational attributes explanation. Generally, in-
stitutions are studied as dynamical patterns of the behaviour of individuals (or any 
social subject). The changes of institutions are in normative institutionalism viewed 
as a process of adaptation to broader social context (March and Olson, 1989). The 
process of learning is characterized here by the changes of codes of conduct in 
organizations – as punctuated equilibria. This framework, with its typical attributes, 
can create respectable basis for the study of organizations as complex learning sys-
tems (Bolfíková, Hrehová and Frenová, 2010), dynamic systems, complex adaptive 
systems (Stacey, 1996).
The sense of Weinberger´s institutionalism use can be found especially in this area 
of organizational theory, that is connected with non-linearity in administrative sys-
tems behaviour (Kiel, 1994), the possibility to create the space of freedom by the 
production of alternatives and variations in decision-making processes (using the 
normative sentences with operator “can be”), the direction of causality (in action 
theory), that is defined also for chaotic deterministic systems.
The “life of institutions” is also inspirational – firstly their stability, that can represent 
one of the paradoxes of complex adaptive systems (Stacey, 1996) – continual pro-
duction of new models of behaviour and the functioning of the old ones at the same 
time. This is the key moment of the remaining of bureaucratic systems explanation.
The logic of Weinberger´s institutionalism can be helpful in the theoretical-empirical 
research of organizations in regard with the attributes of bureaucratic - typical gov-
ernmental (Bolfíková, 2009) and post-bureaucratic - typical cooperative mechanisms 
(in creation, as well as the changes of the values and rules, in decision-making, 
communication, relationships, balance between routine and change, etc.). There 
are also other possibilities of the application of the institutionalism in the study of 
organizations. The specific areas can be discussed in future studies.
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Sažetak
Članak predstavlja Weinbergerov normativni institucionalizam i teoriju akcije kao osnovu 
rješenja nekih odabranih pitanja o odnosu između institucionalnog ponašanja i formalnih 
organizacija. Ukazuje na vitalnost kolaborativnih mehanizama u društvenim sistemima i nudi 
različita razmišljanja i sumnje u vezi sadržaja racionalnih modela formalnih organizacija i 
metodološkog individualizma (Weber).
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